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1. The Future of Law and the Law of the Future 
Stavros Zouridis, Sam Muller and Peter Polakovic* 
In 2011, we published the world’s first Law of the Future Scenarios.1 It was 
an attempt to picture the trends most relevant for the global legal environ-
ment towards 2030. For those who do not know: scenarios are neither pre-
dictions on what the future will look like nor images of desirable futures. 
Quite the contrary: they are wind tunnels in which strategies can be tested 
for robustness, in a variety of winds. 
By publishing these scenarios, we hoped to provoke more future-ori-
ented thinking about legal systems. Rather than moving along law-by-law, 
court-case by court-case, election-by-election, we hoped we could stimu-
late a longer, more strategic approach to how we might want our legal sys-
tems to change. 
At the time of publication of the scenarios, at least two beliefs seemed 
persistent. Despite the economic and financial crises triggered by the bank-
ruptcy of Lehman Brothers in 2007 and the many crises that Europe has 
encountered since, the debate on the European Union (‘EU’) was first 
guided by a belief in multilateral and supranational legal and governance 
regimes. Even at the time of writing in 2018, this belief seems unshakeable. 
For example, the European Commission in 2017 published a white paper 
on the future of Europe. Whereas our scenarios have been developed in 
order to prepare for an uncertain global legal environment, the European 
Commission presented five scenarios as policy options. These policy op-
tions are presented as neutral, but the descriptions of the scenarios implic-
itly assume that European solutions for problems are better than national 
                                                   
*  Stavros Zouridis is Professor of Public Administration at the Tilburg School of Governance 
(Tilburg University). Sam Muller is Director of The Hague Institute for the Internationali-
sation of Law (‘HiiL’). Peter Polakovic is Research Assistant at HiiL. 
1 Sam Muller et al. (eds.), The Law of the Future and the Future of Law, Torkel Opsahl Aca-
demic EPublisher (‘TOAEP’), Oslo, 2011. 
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ones. For example, in describing the pros and cons of the scenario ‘Those 
who want more do more’, the European Commission argues that the gap 
between public expectations and actual governance performance starts to 
close in the countries that want and choose to do more. Hence, the assump-
tion is that European solutions are intrinsically more effective than national 
solutions. When our scenarios were published, there was a widespread idea 
that globalisation creates new transnational problems that, in turn, require 
legal and governance solutions that transcend national boundaries. Even in 
2018, politicians who question the inevitability of such a progression are 
usually referred to as populists. The banking and fiscal crises spurred a sec-
ond belief at the start of this decade – next to the necessity of international 
governance and law, these crises allegedly proved that private legal and 
governance mechanisms of self-regulation do not work. Self-regulation and 
private governance regimes were increasingly questioned, fuelled by finan-
cial crises and industrial scandals (such as the emissions scandal in the EU). 
In turn, we observed a strong demand for international public governance 
regimes. 
Our scenarios opened up alternative futures for the global legal and 
governance environment. Some seven years after we first published the 
Law of the Future Scenarios, we have decided to produce an update herein. 
We seek here to answer the questions: Which scenarios seem to evolve? 
What trends can be observed in the global legal and governance environ-
ment? A framework for such an update has been provided by the EU-funded 
FLAGSHIP project. Using the European Commission’s White Paper as a 
point of departure, we have been able to re-think both the trends and the 
scenarios, and use the scenarios as a wind tunnel to test the robustness of 
the legal and governance strategies of the European Commission. The 
chapters in this volume reflect on the trends that underlie the Law of the 
Future Scenarios, and serve as a third building block for testing the robust-
ness of the EU’s legal and governance strategies.  
In this introduction, we summarize the subsequent chapters and use 
insights borne thereof to conduct such testing. This chapter starts with a 
brief explanation of the Law of the Future Scenarios and a recapitulation of 
the EU’s legal and governance strategies (section 1.1). Next, we briefly 
summarize the key insights of the papers (section 1.2). Finally, we explore 
the implications of testing the robustness of the EU’s legal and governance 
strategies (section 1.3). 
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1.1. The Law of the Future Scenarios and the EU’s Legal and 
Governance Strategies 
1.1.1. The Law of the Future Scenarios 
Scenarios are used in contexts in which uncertainty is ubiquitous. The Law 
of the Future Scenarios focus on the global legal and governance environ-
ment in which authoritative rule-making, rule-enforcement, and processes 
of dispute resolution take place. Conceptually, the global legal environment 
does not imply that rules are made that span the entire globe or that these 
rules are globally enforced. In our definition, the global legal environment 
refers to a multi-layered phenomenon including all mechanisms of author-
itative rule-making, rule-enforcement, and dispute resolution that transcend 
national borders. It emerges out of the actions of both public and private 
legal actors, the ideas and research of legal scholars, and the initiatives and 
actions of international institutions. Even though national legislators’ be-
haviour affects the global legal and governance environment, it emerges to 
a large extent without being directed. There is no Chief Executive Officer. 
Basically, we therefore assume that the future of the global legal and gov-
ernance environment is uncertain. We need scenarios to deal with the future 
uncertainties.  
The research that led to the Law of the Future Scenarios started with 
mapping major trends in the global legal and governance environment. The 
outcomes were published in two extensive volumes that include contribu-
tions from a substantial number of legal scholars and lawyers from different 
disciplines and different parts of the world.2 
From these papers and a number of workshops we held in different 
parts of the world, we distilled two major trends – the internationalisation 
of law and the growth of private governance regimes. These trends are not 
new and have extensively been mapped elsewhere.3 Both will be briefly 
explained hereinafter. 
                                                   
2 Ibid. And Sam Muller, Stavros Zouridis, Morly Frishman and Laura Kistemaker (eds.): The 
Law of the Future and the Future of Law: Volume II, TOAEP, The Hague, 2012.  
3 For example, Jan Klabbers and Mortimer Sellers (eds.), The Internationalization of Law and 
Legal Education, Springer, London, 2009; Michael Joachim Bonell, “The CISG, European 
Contract Law and the Development of a World Contract Law”, in American Journal of Com-
parative Law, 2008, vol. 56, no. 1, p. 3 on law beyond the state.  
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First, a growing patchwork of international law, international institu-
tions, and transnational co-operation is observed. Growing international 
trade has gone along with the internationalisation of contract law, torts, 
business law, and intellectual property law. Since national laws are not har-
monised, conflicts and gaps between national laws are increasingly re-
vealed. These conflicts exert pressure on governments to harmonise their 
legislation and their legal systems. The internationalisation of law thus re-
fers to growing interdependencies and interchange between national legal 
systems and the accommodation of national legal systems to these interde-
pendencies and interchange. Internationalisation is a global trend but it is 
not happening in the same way, with the same depth, and in the same areas 
across the world. Two important clarifications must be made. First, legal 
globalisation and the rise of global governance do not mean that a coherent 
corpus of law is evolving that spans the whole globe. Legal globalisation 
and the globalisation of governance refer to a patchwork both with regard 
to the legal and governance areas involved and to the extent of internation-
alisation. For example, the legal globalisation of trade law mainly occurs 
on the regional level. The EU is probably the most far-reaching instance. 
Different legal areas also seem to evolve at a different pace. For example, 
the internationalisation of trade law seems to move faster than the interna-
tionalisation of criminal procedure. The internationalisation of law and 
governance neither implies voluntarism nor a consciously-built body of 
global law. Instead, incidents, crises, and the continuous manifestation of 
new problems are the primary drivers of the process.  
The growth of private governance regimes for rule-making, rule-en-
forcement, and dispute resolution indicate a second major trend. Both na-
tional and international law have, for many years, firmly rested on public 
authority and state institutions. Nevertheless, new private regimes seem to 
be booming. These private regimes appear in different shapes. A business 
sector, sometimes together with non-governmental organisations 
(‘NGOs’), can set standards, guidelines, or rules concerning governance or 
liabilities. For example, the Brewers of Europe have enacted the Responsi-
ble Commercial Communications Guidelines for the Brewing Industry.4 
The timber industry – with the Forest Stewardship Council – produced 
                                                   
4 The Brewers of Europe, Responsible Commercial Communications: Guidelines for the 
Brewing Industry, 2012. 
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standards on sustainable logging and the sale of timber.5 Sometimes an in-
dustry creates a standard contract or agreement. The Model Mine Develop-
ment Agreement, developed in consultation with mining companies, gov-
ernments, and civil society within the context of the International Bar As-
sociation, is a prime example.6 Another facet of this trend is the growing 
use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms instead of court systems. 
The eBay/PayPal resolution centre solves around 60 million disagreements 
between buyers and sellers every year. In the EU, a Common Frame of 
Reference for European Private Law was drafted and freely made available 
on the Internet.7 This was not a government initiative; instead it sprang forth 
from European legal scholars. It has now become a point of reference for 
legislators and courts in the EU.  
The trend towards privatisation of law also requires some elaboration 
to prevent misunderstanding. First, the rise of private regimes does not 
mean that these are isolated from legal regimes created by public authori-
ties. For example, private initiatives may spark off public regulation. Sec-
ondly, here too, we see wide diversity. Private regimes may refer to rules, 
standards or guidelines but may also refer to authoritative mechanisms of 
dispute resolution. The term ‘soft law’ may be used, but in their actual ef-
fect, guidelines can sometimes be as ‘hard’ as law. Whereas a large-scale 
business organisation may not be touched by an administrative fine of sev-
eral million Euros, it may fear not having access to a stock exchange due 
to non-compliance with the code of conduct regarding child labour.  
There is no reason to assume that these trends will continue in the 
same direction and at the same pace. Moreover, there are several clues that 
they may also reverse. For example, both within the EU and in other parts 
of the world, national borders, national identity, and national interests are 
being re-discovered. The Brexit referendum and its aftermath, the growth 
of nationalist political parties in many European countries, the election of 
president Trump and his agenda of putting America first, and the growing 
self-consciousness of the Russian state indicate that national borders have 
                                                   
5 Forest Stewardship Council, Forest Management Standards, 2010. 
6 Mining Law Committee of the International Bar Association, Model Mining Development 
Agreement Project, available on the project web site, last accessed 9 March 2017. 
7 Study Group on a European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law, Prin-
ciples, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of 
Reference. 
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not become obsolete. Both the internationalisation and the privatisation of 
law and governance should therefore be regarded as uncertainties or con-
tingencies for the future global legal and governance environment. Will we 
witness continued internationalisation of rules and institutions or will this 
trend reverse? Both futures are possible. International trade, communica-
tion, travel, migration, and such phenomena that transcend national borders 
will generate international interdependencies that in turn require law and 
governance. Simultaneously, we observe a renaissance of national interest 
and national borders. Whether internationalisation of law and governance 
will continue in the next decades remains to be seen. The same applies to 
the privatisation of law and governance. Will private governance mecha-
nisms and private legal regimes further expand and become dominant, or 
will state-connected institutions and legal regimes retain their position? 
Currently, there is no decisive trend that indicates either one of these fu-
tures. Instead, both futures can already be observed in their embryonic 
stages. If the two trends are regarded as uncertainties or contingencies, they 
point at four possible future scenarios. 
Taken together, these contingencies conceptually allow four different 
scenarios (see Table 1 below). 
 
  






















Table 1. Global legal and governance scenarios. 
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These scenarios picture possible global legal and governance envi-
ronments that may emerge in the next decades.8 Regarding the names we 
have given each of the scenarios, rather than taking them for their literal 
meaning, one ought to bear in mind that they refer to metaphors meant to 
convey the central feature of each scenario. Thus, ‘Global Constitution’ 
does not imply there will actually be a single world constitution, but rather, 
that in this scenario the global legal environment will increasingly resemble 
an international constitutional order. In ‘Legal Internet’, the name does not 
mean that this scenario is about the Internet. Instead, it implies that the 
global legal environment in this world is characterised by a decentralized 
transnational network involving a big range of actors in which co-ordina-
tion, governance, rule-making and so on are not regulated from the top. 
Similarly, ‘Legal Tribes’ does not denote a world that is composed of tribes, 
rather, it hints to a reality whereby the global legal environment is com-
posed of many relatively small ‘communities’ with relatively little contact 
and co-ordination, and a weaker role for the state. Finally, ‘Legal Borders’ 
does not imply that legal walls will be built between national legal systems, 
but instead emphasises the increased importance or renaissance of national 
and regional sovereignty. 
These scenarios reveal quite different possible futures for 2030. In 
the ‘Global Constitution’ scenario, an international constitutional order 
would have emerged during the next decades, slowly but surely covering 
all major legal areas on a global scale – trade, environment, security, crime, 
finance, markets and competition, intellectual property, labour, taxation, 
and health – leaving only a few areas untouched by international rules and 
procedures. Global law would not be driven by a specific set of values or 
leading legal systems. Instead, the process of blending would, to a large 
extent, be eclectic. Whereas global competition law and contract law would 
be primarily fuelled by free market ideals, global criminal law would be led 
by retaliatory principles. It would therefore become more punitive and strict 
than European countries are used to. The principle of legality – all govern-
ments are bound by law – would be the broadly accepted principle under-
lying the global legal environment. The global constitutional order would 
not be based on one document or charter, but rather on a series of charters 
and constitution-like documents, in which international regulators, 
                                                   
8  See also Sam Muller et al., Law Scenarios to 2030, HiiL, 2012. 
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adjudicators, and courts would be defined and connected with each other. 
This multi-layered system would be complex, and at times Byzantine. The 
rules and institutions that make up this global legal environment would be 
difficult to change once formalised. The enforcement of rules would be 
public in nature, or a clear derivative thereof.  
In the ‘Legal Borders’ scenario, national and regional legislation 
would become the primary source of rule-making in 2030. Regional and 
sub-regional organisations would be the ultimate defence against what 
would widely be perceived as out-of-control international institutions and 
an international environment in which common values would be scarce. 
The international level would be for politics, not law. There would be a lot 
less talk about universality than there once was. In fact, most would agree 
that there is no universality. With regional legal pluralism, the rule of law 
would also be regionally pluralised. As a consequence, context-specific re-
gional and national interpretations of concepts such as fundamental human 
rights, separation of church and state, balance of powers, and the principle 
of legality would prevail. The international institutions that were developed 
at the end of the twentieth century would slowly erode and lose their sig-
nificance. In some instances, states would withdraw ratifications, in others 
they would be being minimally interpreted at best, and otherwise com-
pletely ignored. International courts – insofar as they are given adequate 
funding – would face strong pressure to reduce their footprint and the scope 
of their decisions. Enforcement would also be a national affair. In some 
areas, such as environmental law, enforcement would be loosely co-ordi-
nated on a regional level to prevent natural disasters.  
In the ‘Legal Internet’ scenario, rules – in the sense that lawyers are 
used to – would be a lot less important in 2030. New generations would 
have become acquainted with new ways of rule-making, law enforcement, 
and resolving disputes. Reputation, trust, transparency, mobilisation of 
voice, and demonstrated effectiveness would be the new mechanisms to 
secure a social and political order. Formal rules and procedures would be 
considered old-fashioned, too formal, ineffective, too uniform, and too in-
flexible. Public rules would gradually be replaced or marginalised by stand-
ards developed by private actors. Monitoring and even enforcement would 
be dealt with by private regimes and mechanisms created by the parties 
involved. Democracy or accountability would be less a matter of working 
through parliaments and more a matter of working through interest groups 
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and loosely organised structures that operate between interest groups. Self-
regulation would be the prime source of legitimacy. Private rule-making, 
enforcement, and dispute resolution mechanisms would usually be flexible 
and efficient, whereas public regimes would be more bureaucratic and 
rigid. The absence of clear, all-encompassing organising principles, like the 
principle of legality, the United Nations (‘UN’) definition of the rule of law, 
or state sovereignty, would make the global legal environment complex, 
often confusing and largely unstable.  
Finally, in the ‘Legal Tribes’ scenario, the global legal environment 
would witness a severe loss of relevance of the state combined with a loss 
of interest in internationalisation. In this scenario, by 2030, the global legal 
environment would consist of a largely unconnected group of communities 
that govern themselves. In many ways states would become failed states. 
Global security would be a serious issue and law would have been com-
pletely abandoned as a way to achieve it. Local security, which would be 
mainly self-organised, would be the main basis for ordering. Besides, order 
would be local and mainly privatised, maintained through a small-scale net-
works of security corporations, communities and civil society organisa-
tions, and supported, where possible and useful, by small public structures. 
The state and the international global legal environment would wither 
away. International organisations would lose their relevance and close due 
to lack of interest, funds, effectiveness, and legitimacy. Next to state bor-
ders, the global legal environment would also witness religious borders, 
borders organised around economic activities, ethnic borders, and political 
borders. The old regional organisations would lose much of their economic 
raison d’être. The successful ones would transform into security alliances: 
public-private regional fences within which smaller communities could 
conduct economic activity on a larger than local scale. The main role of the 
public realm would be to deal with the link between the huge variety of 
private, self-regulatory regimes. But with a greatly reduced tax base, re-
sources would be limited. As a leading principle, the rule of law would have 
become an anachronistic concept. Enforcement would be a local and mostly 
private affair. Social control, groups taking justice into their own hands, 
and militias maintaining order would be predominant in many parts of the 
world, whereas religious or public authorities would take up these tasks in 
other regions.  
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1.1.2. The EU’s Legal and Governance Strategies 
As indicated above, these scenarios were first presented in 2011 as a means 
to provoke a future-oriented debate on law and governance built on uncer-
tainty and analysis instead of ideology and policy. One would expect public 
institutions to adopt a learning behaviour that accords with the adage, once 
bitten, twice shy. Thus, we would anticipate that the European debate on 
the future of law and governance would have become more open for the 
scenarios after a series of events that shook previously unshakeable beliefs. 
The migration crisis, the continuing Euro crisis, Brexit and more generally 
the dramatically declining political support for international, multilateral, 
and supranational institutions compels European institutions to get in-
volved in some serious double-loop learning.9 Double-loop learning re-
quires questioning fundamental assumptions in order to align them with the 
societal and political environment. Is it truly natural for law and governance 
to increasingly shift towards transnational institutions? Is the international-
isation of law and governance necessarily a linear and inevitable historical 
process? Should governments not also take into account the possibility that 
this process could reverse, and be strategically prepared for that eventual-
ity?  
Double-loop learning is both difficult and rare in public organisations 
and institutions. The European Commission can hardly be seen as an ex-
ception in this respect. Its recently published ‘White Paper on the Future of 
Europe’ demonstrates the difficulty in questioning the very foundations on 
which it is built.10 In its White Paper, the European Commission does ques-
tion its role and position, but even the most minimal scenario imaginable 
by the European Commission – the ‘Nothing but the single market’ scenario 
– entails more European Union. The EU would then focus on ‘deepening 
certain key aspects of the single market’. We would argue that major shifts 
in the global legal and governance environment, as depicted in our scenar-
ios, require a fundamental re-thinking of these foundations and strategies. 
Instead of double-loop reflection in the realm of legal and governance 
                                                   
9 Chris Argyris, On Organizational Learning, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1993. 
10 European Commission, White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and scenarios for 
the EU27 by 2025, COM (2017) 2025, 1 March 2017 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/b2888a/). 
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strategies, we observe that the European Commission does not move be-
yond single-loop learning and stricter enforcement of existing strategies.  
For example, in March 2014, the European Commission decided to 
adopt a new, proactive rule of law policy. In its communication, the Euro-
pean Commission presented a new EU framework to strengthen the rule of 
law.11 In its rule of law strategy presented by the European Commission in 
March 2015, the Commission concludes that the current EU legal frame-
work is not adequate for addressing internal, systemic threats to the rule of 
law and more generally EU values. This conclusion is drawn after some 
rule of law-related crises. Former EU Justice Commissioner Reding men-
tioned some concrete examples of these crises in a speech given on 4 Sep-
tember 2013,12 including the French government’s attempt in 2010 to im-
plement a collective deportation policy aimed at EU citizens of Romani 
ethnicity, the Hungarian government’s attempt to implement an early man-
datory retirement policy for the judiciary and the non-compliance of the 
Romanian government with judgments of the national constitutional court 
in 2012. The rule of law strategy emphasises that the EU legal framework 
is no longer adequate due to non-compliance by governments. Double-loop 
learning would imply a reflection on whether the legal framework still 
matches with the European social and political context and, if not, what 
changes should be implemented. Instead, the European Commission de-
cides to focus only on a stricter enforcement of the framework, including 
penalties. It does not ask a number of questions, such as whether the thick 
approach of the rule of law13 still builds on the social conventions and gen-
eralized morality in Europe, or whether this approach to the rule of law 
produces adverse and politically-undesirable effects. The same applies to 
the external legal strategy of the European Commission. With regard to its 
external policies and global legal strategies, Article 3(5) (previously Article 
                                                   
11 European Commission Communication, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of 
Law, COM (2014) 158 Final, 11 March 2014 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7f7703/). 
12 Dimitry Kochenov and Laurent Pech, Upholding the Rule of Law in the EU: On the Com-
mission’s ‘Pre-Article 7 Procedure’ as a Timid Step in the Right Direction, Robert Schuman 
Centre for Advanced Studies, Research Paper No. 2015/24, 2015. 
13 See Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, 2004. 
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2(5)) of the Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’) provides some strict guide-
lines. It stipulates:14 
In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold 
and promote its values and interests and contribute to the pro-
tection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the 
sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual 
respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of pov-
erty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights 
of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the devel-
opment of international law, including respect for the princi-
ples of the United Nations Charter. 
The external rule of law approach includes both formal and substan-
tive versions and it appears as thick as the internal rule of law approach 
(see, for instance, Articles 21 and 23 of the TEU). The same principles 
should be taken into account in the relations between the EU and its neigh-
bours (see Article 8 of the TEU). Second, with regard to the global legal 
environment TEU also explicitly addresses the ideals to be strived for. Ar-
ticle 21(1) of the TEU reads: 
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided 
by the principles which have inspired its own creation, devel-
opment and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the 
wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, re-
spect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidar-
ity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Char-
ter and international law. 
The Union shall seek to develop relations and build part-
nerships with third countries, and international, regional or 
global organisations which share the principles referred to in 
the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions 
to common problems, in particular in the framework of the 
United Nations. 
The framework of the UN appears to be the EU’s most desired frame-
work for multilateral co-operation. Global economic integration and global 
harmonisation of the rule of law and human rights are also explicitly stated 
in Article 21 of the TEU to be the goals of the external (including 
                                                   
14 Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, 92/C 191/01 (http://www.legal-
tools.org/doc/806147/). 
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international) policies of the EU. For example, the external policies should 
be directed towards promoting an international system based on stronger 
multilateral co-operation and good global governance, as set out in Article 
21(2)(h) of the TEU. In its Stockholm programme, the European Council 
reaffirms the importance of promoting fundamental rights both within and 
outside the EU. The Council argues that the ‘values of the Union should be 
promoted and strict compliance with and development of international law 
should be respected’.15 The programme also defines the key partners of the 
EU, in particular: 
• Candidate countries and countries with an EU membership perspective, 
for which the main objective would be to assist them in transposing the 
acquis; 
• European neighbourhood countries, and other key partners with whom 
the EU should co-operate on all issues in the area of freedom, security 
and justice; 
• European Economic Area/Schengen states which have a close relation-
ship with the Union; 
• The United States (‘US’), the Russian Federation and other strategic 
partners with which the EU should co-operate on all issues in the area 
of freedom, security and justice; 
• Other countries or regions of priority, in terms of their contribution to 
EU strategic or geographical priorities; and 
• International organisations such as the UN and the Council of Europe 
with whom the EU needs to continue to work and within which the EU 
should co-ordinate its position.  
With regard to international organisations, the Council reaffirms the 
UN as the foundation for global governance in its Stockholm programme: 
The UN remains the most important international organisation 
for the Union. The Lisbon Treaty creates the basis for more 
coherent and efficient Union participation in the work of the 
UN and other international organisations. 
The Union should continue to promote European and in-
ternational standards and the ratification of international 
                                                   
15 European Council, The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and 
Protecting Citizens, 2010/C 115/01, 4 May 2010 (http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/c6ada7/). 
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conventions, in particular those developed under the auspices 
of the UN and the Council of Europe.  
Strengthening the UN is also a cornerstone of the European Security 
and Defence Policy. The EU appears to prefer a multilateral global order in 
which the UN is positioned at the top. In its policies, the European Council 
also chooses to co-operate with regional organisations (such as the African 
Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and global players 
like the US and China. 
In this recapitulation of the EU’s legal and governance strategies, we 
observe a strong reliance on the ‘Global Constitution’ scenario. The analy-
sis of the rule of law strategies of the European Commission and the EU 
clearly indicates that there is a European desire for a global constitution. 
The strategies thus anticipate on a ‘Global Constitution’ scenario in which 
multilateral public authorities dominate as the entities that create and up-
hold law and settle transnational disputes. These public authorities should 
be governed by ‘thicker’ rule of law principles. Other scenarios are not in-
cluded or taken into account in the legal strategies of the European Com-
mission and the EU which makes them vulnerable to changes in the global 
legal environment.  
Second, it seems plausible that, if other scenarios occur, they will 
severely impede the effectiveness and tenability of the current rule of law 
strategy. Both movements along the axis (more privatisation and less inter-
nationalisation) will render these strategies void. In case of further privati-
sation, the rule of law strategy may actually still be pursued, but it would 
be overtaken by private mechanisms that better regulate and enforce law, 
and perhaps even the rule of law. Whether rule of law principles are in-
cluded in private legal and governance mechanisms does not seem to matter 
because the legal strategies of the European Commission only aim at public 
authorities, hence the ‘Global Constitution’ scenario. In case of reversed 
internationalisation, the legal strategy would anticipate only a limited ex-
tent of grassroots rule of law development.  
Third, the existing legal strategies do not seem very flexible in the 
sense that it is possible to switch to alternative strategies in case other sce-
narios evolve. Because of the narrow focus on ‘Global Constitution’ and 
the inflexibility of that scenario, the lead time for any other scenario may 
be quite long. Whereas the rule of law strategy of the European 
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Commission and the EU seems to be evidence-based, it hardly appears to 
be future-proof.  
1.2. The Global Legal and Governance Environment: Trends and 
Uncertainties 
1.2.1. Ambiguity and Uncertainty are Here to Stay 
This volume reflects on the robustness of the European legal and govern-
ance strategies as sketched above. It aims at capturing some of the major 
trends and hiccups in the global legal and governance environment, and it 
thus provides building blocks for future-proof legal and governance strate-
gies. With the scenarios in mind, we asked a number of great minds to re-
flect on topical developments and the future of law and governance. The 
papers in this volume point towards a growing ambiguity and uncertainty 
of the global legal environment. 
The demolition of the Berlin wall in 1989 heralded a new era and 
infused the world with the promise of a new world order. Politics would 
transform into regulatory governance, political controversies would trans-
form into management issues, global markets would accelerate the wealth 
of nations, and if borders would not dissolve completely, they would at least 
become permeable. The ideology of globalisation and the spirit of cosmo-
politanism seized the world and became the roadmaps towards global pros-
perity, freedom, and welfare.  
Globalisation also affected the global legal and governance environ-
ment. In general, because of globalisation, the rule of law would become 
one of the cornerstones of governments all over the world. For a long time, 
many indications supported these hypotheses. Both the rule of law in its 
‘thin’ meaning (that is, the principle of lawfulness or legality) and in its 
‘thick’ meaning (including democracy and fundamental rights) spread 
across the globe. For example, for many years, Freedom House demon-
strated a global tendency towards freedom and the world witnessed a sig-
nificant improvement in economic growth.  
In 2007, the first cracks were observed in this ongoing process. The 
adoption of democracy, freedom, and rule of law in the world stagnated 
according to some indicators. But there were more signals that the promise 
of 1989 would not be fulfilled, at least not in the short-run. First, the dark 
sides of globalisation increasingly revealed themselves and dominated the 
public and political agenda. Globalisation goes along with increasing 
 
Towards Shockproof European Legal and Governance Strategies 
Law of the Future Series No. 4 (2018) – page 16 
prosperity and increased living standards, but also with dramatic growth of 
transnational crime, illicit trade, terrorism, global inequality, and uncon-
trolled migration. Second, the financial and economic crises triggered in 
2008 demonstrated that global interdependencies could also cause major 
economic damage. Third, a new geo-political power balance seemed to 
evolve partly because of the economic rise of some countries and the sim-
ultaneous economic stagnation in the Western world. Naim observes a ma-
jor power shift from previously strong formal institutions such as govern-
ments, international organisations, and global corporations, to the grass-
roots level and small-business entrepreneurs.16 Kagan has observed a power 
shift from the US and Europe to a more balanced global constellation.17 
Whereas Europe was forced to focus on its internal crises, new global pow-
ers such as China and Russia entered the global law and governance arena.  
The self-evident and sometimes even complacent belief in a global 
diffusion of the rule of law as interpreted by the EU has become inappro-
priate and unproductive. Contrary to some expectations, the world does not 
automatically appear to move towards Western interpretations of the rule 
of law. The self-evidence of a global linear historical process towards mo-
dernity as experienced in Europe is fundamentally contested by Comaroff 
and Comaroff.18 Their argument is as follows: 
Contrary to the received Euromodernist narrative of the past 
two centuries – which has the global south tracking behind the 
curve of Universal History, always in deficit, always playing 
catch-up – there is good reason to think the opposite: that, 
given the unpredictable, under-determined dialectic of capi-
talism-and-modernity in the here and now, it is the south that 
often is the first to feel the effects of world-historical forces, 
the south in which radically new assemblages of capital and 
labor are taking shape, thus to prefigure the future of the 
global north.  
                                                   
16 Moises Naim, The End of Power: From Boardrooms to Battlefields and Churches to States, 
Why Being In Charge Isn’t What It Used to Be, Basic Books, New York, 2013. 
17 Robert Kagan, The Return of History and the End of Dreams, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 
2008.  
18 Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, Theory From the South: Or, How Euro-America is 
Evolving Toward Africa, Routledge, London, 2012, p. 12. 
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Instead of a diffusion of belief systems and legal and governance in-
stitutions from Europe to the rest of the world, we may well witness the 
opposite. For example, the adverse effects of extreme neo-liberalism first 
emerged in Africa, Asia and Latin America in the 1990s, and the financial 
and economic crises in Europe and the US followed a decade later. Whereas 
other parts of the world have developed institutions to correct these effects, 
Europe is still in the process of developing these solutions. Comaroff and 
Comaroff argue that Europe has adopted some African belief systems to 
deal with these effects.19 For example, African theories on participatory de-
mocracy, leadership, community, and accountability increasingly gain 
ground in Europe.  
European and international institutions as well as national govern-
ments have developed responses to the crises that embody some of these 
major global changes. New transnational legal and governance institutions 
have been set up to cope with some of the dark sides of globalisation and 
some of the global economic and financial interdependencies. For example, 
treaties on cybercrime have been agreed upon, financial stability pro-
grammes have been erected, and new European instruments have been de-
veloped, such as the European arrest warrant. Existing global institutions 
have strengthened their positions and have been reformed to meet the de-
mands of the new global balance of power. Last, but certainly not least, 
many private legal and governance mechanisms have evolved. Institutional 
adaptation has taken place not only on the transnational and international 
level. For example, a quest for new legal borders also reappeared as a re-
sponse to the new global challenges.  
Both the rapid succession of global crises and the urgent crisis re-
sponse strategies demonstrate that the global legal environment has become 
both highly ambiguous and uncertain. The ambiguity arises from the many 
directions towards which these trends point at. Newly set up transnational 
and international legal institutions go along with new national legal bor-
ders, public attempts to respond to global challenges go along with rising 
private legal and governance mechanisms, and the rule of law both in its 
‘thin’ meaning and in its ‘thick’ meaning has lost its self-evidence outside 
a small community of lawyers. The global legal environment has also be-
come difficult to predict, with uncertainty characterising this environment 
                                                   
19  Ibid. 
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due to the rapid pace of change. Economic, political, and social drivers of 
the global legal environment seem to change with ever-increasing pace – 
yesterday’s coalitions may become tomorrow’s enemies. Nobody can pre-
dict what the global legal and governance environment will look like in ten, 
twenty or thirty years. Of course, the community of lawyers may keep on 
believing in its scholastic rule of law interpretations and a predominantly 
public, multilateral, and supranational global legal environment. This belief 
system, however, will not be a sound basis for the strategies pursued by 
national and international law-makers in an increasingly ambiguous and 
uncertain global legal and governance environment. Thorough and contin-
uous analysis and monitoring of the global legal and governance environ-
ment seems to be the only viable alternative to predictions and ideologies. 
1.2.2. Shockproof Law and Governance in a Volatile World Order: 
Some Building Blocks 
The chapters in this volume offer some building blocks for an assessment 
of the global legal and governance environment. As Joerges argues, trans-
national governance has too long been regarded as a technical matter. In-
stead of an emphasis on the regulation of global trade, he suggests a focus 
on the legitimacy of transnational governance. Borrowing from Karl Po-
lanyi who stressed the social, cultural, and political embeddedness of trade 
and markets, Joerges argues that this basic notion may have been over-
looked in previous trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade and those of the World Trade Organization. If the opposition 
and protests against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(‘TTIP’) and the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agree-
ment (‘CETA’) are again neglected, the legitimacy impasse will continue 
and worsen. For a way out, Joerges reverts to a framework suggested by 
Rodrik. The globalisation trilemma hypothesis argues that it is impossible 
to simultaneously pursue trade globalisation, national autonomy, and de-
mocracy. Pursuing trade globalisation and national autonomy requires na-
tional governments to become technocratic and hence it will come at the 
cost of democracy. More democracy and trade globalisation require that 
transnational democratic legal and governance regimes are developed and 
that means that national autonomy has to be given up. Finally, combining 
national autonomy and democracy will negatively affect the level of trade 
globalisation. After an extensive analysis of the TTIP process, Joerges con-
cludes that, given the current context, it would be wise to choose democracy 
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and more national autonomy. Joerges accepts the limitations on further ex-
pansion of trade globalisation inherently connected with choosing for na-
tional autonomy and democracy.  
In their paper, Renda and Cafaggi focus on transnational private reg-
ulation (‘TPR’). They demonstrate the enormous variety of TPR schemes 
that have evolved during the past decades. TPR schemes nowadays include 
the involvement of private actors in the agenda-setting phase of policy-
makers, often alongside the implementation and enforcement of private 
rules. TPR schemes may also involve private transnational standards that 
complement public regulation. These schemes may be governed by experts, 
firms, NGOs or epistemic communities and global governance increasingly 
depends on TPR in order to meet the global challenges. Whereas TPR 
schemes are considered highly legitimate by the private actors involved, 
Renda and Cafaggi emphasise that they still experience a number of prob-
lems and challenges in the ‘delivery’ phase of their rules. In particular, com-
pliance-monitoring and -enforcement need to be strengthened in order to 
make TPR schemes work better. Connecting public regulation with the TPR 
schemes may be useful to both accommodate better compliance monitoring 
and enforcement and achieve a better alignment of private benefits and so-
cial goals. According to Renda and Cafaggi, the “key opportunity is fully 
integrating TPR in international regulatory co-operation schemes aimed at 
tackling the most important societal problems”. Further integration of pub-
lic and private regulatory schemes may also prevent lock-in effects and self-
indulgence in the evaluation of private regulatory bodies. 
As argued above, the global legal and governance environment both 
displays uncertainty with regard to its future and ambiguity with regard to 
its current state. Williams provides an assessment of the current state of 
global governance. Based on his analysis that order and justice are concep-
tually closely connected, he argues that the international order urgently 
needs more justice. Williams distinguishes three conditions for a just inter-
national order. First, a just international order requires peace. However im-
portant, peace is not enough to achieve justice. Both adequate representa-
tion of individual and collective interests and the creation of “genuine op-
portunities for the development of states, communities, and individuals” 
are necessary to transform negative peace into positive peace. The absence 
of representation and equal opportunities on the global scale will produce 
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an international order that is inherently unstable because it will lack legiti-
macy. Williams calls upon the UN to address this multi-faceted challenge:  
It is the UN, through the Security Council, that has the pri-
mary responsibility for maintaining international peace and 
security, and in so doing, preventing the eruption of deadly 
conflict which undermines both order and justice. It is the UN, 
furthermore, that provides all states with a representative fo-
rum, and through its institutional machinery can ensure that 
their interests are taken into account. And it is the UN, finally, 
which provides normative leadership, by advancing aims such 
as human rights, gender equality and sustainable develop-
ment, through the work of its agencies, funds and programs, 
the policies agreed on by its members, and the public pro-
nouncements of its leaders. 
In order to play its necessary role to achieve a just international order, the 
UN should further reform. Representation can be improved in the Security 
Council and in the judicial institutions. Creating opportunity, the third pillar 
of a just international order, requires more than the UN. It should also in-
clude states and non-state actors. 
An analysis of the current global legal and governance environment 
and its future runs the risk of a Western bias. A number of papers therefore 
focus on the global legal and governance environment from a non-Western 
perspective. The need for such a perspective is very much underscored by 
Mishina’s paper on the Russian legal environment. Her analysis of legisla-
tive development in Russia clearly demonstrates that the Russian govern-
ment is moving away from the principles and the global legal environment 
envisioned by Western governments. The government openly defies rulings 
of the European Court of Human Rights and increasingly criminalises the 
undesired use of political freedoms. According to Mishina, these legislative 
developments indicate further escalation of authoritarianism in Russia and 
even possible transformation into totalitarianism. These developments will 
dramatically affect the global legal and governance environment. Contrary 
to the just international order as portrayed by Williams with peace as a cor-
nerstone, according to Mishina, Russia may be preparing for ‘Cold War II’. 
Russia’s direct move away from the global legal environment, as en-
visioned by Europe and the US, and sketched by Mishina, points at erosion 
of the very foundations. With his analysis of the constitutionalisation pro-
cess in Brazil, Neves indicates an opposite trend though it should be 
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interpreted cautiously. On the surface, the gradual constitutionalisation of 
Brazil and its connectivity with the predominantly Inter-American legal in-
stitutions can be interpreted as a move towards global constitutionalism. 
Looking at the constitution and court decisions does not suffice to truly 
understand what is happening in Brazil. Underneath the legal and constitu-
tional developments, Neves observes “a flaw in our capacity to implement 
liberal values”. Obviously, the gradual constitutionalisation of Brazil 
should be understood as a long-term development that took place during 
the twentieth century. It would be too simplistic to interpret this process as 
the gradual adoption of Western constitutional conceptions by Brazil. 
Neves argues that a trans-constitutionalism would be a more appropriate 
concept to understand what happened:  
Trans-constitutionalism means that two or more legal orders 
or organisations, whether of the same kind or different kinds, 
engage simultaneously in the same constitutional case or 
problem.  
Instead of the one-sided adoption of Inter-American and hence Western le-
gal and governance conceptions, an interplay of legal conceptions is taking 
place. The relationship between the Inter-American human rights system, 
as introduced by the American Convention on Human Rights, and national 
Brazilian law provides an example of trans-constitutionalism. Neves men-
tions some cases in which the Brazilian constitution collides with the Inter-
American legal regime. He concludes that the concept of trans-constitution-
alism “offers a higher potential for effective constitutionalisation of several 
legal orders under different cultural contexts than models of cosmopolitan 
constitutionalism of Eurocentric or Western-centric base, which are not 
able to learn from the other”. 
In his paper, Ginsburg mentions Brazil as an example of constitu-
tional flexibility. The constitution provided mandatory review after a trial 
period in order to test its workability. In a referendum five years after the 
adoption of the constitution, the Brazilian people decided on whether to 
retain presidentialism or adopt parliamentarism. Even though the voters de-
cided to maintain presidentialism, this is clearly an example of constitu-
tional flexibility. With an ever more volatile global legal environment, legal 
and governance orders urgently need flexible regimes. Ginsburg suggests 
at least three existing mechanisms of constitutional adjustment. First, con-
stitutions can be amended. If amendment is allowed, constitutions usually 
include specific procedures and requirement for constitutional amendment. 
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A second mechanism for constitutional adjustment is interpretation. Gins-
burg observes a global rise of constitutional review and supreme courts 
around the world “exercising powers that would have been unthinkable just 
a few decades ago”. Constitutions can also be replaced. As Ginsburg argues 
“most constitutions die at a relatively young age”. These mechanisms for 
constitutional adjustment provide some clues for a global legal environ-
ment that has to deal with increased volatility. Ginsburg therefore suggests 
an iterative global legal environment. Transitional, interim, or temporary 
deals for problems of international co-operation that have been broken 
down into “discrete component parts” may be useful solutions for the cur-
rent impasse. The rigidity of treaty regimes may be softened with manda-
tory reviews such as the Brazilian referendum. Mandatory reviews oblige 
the states and other parties to renew their commitment and to bargain again 
for a better deal. Paradoxically, these flexibility mechanisms may provide 
for some stability of the global legal environment in a volatile world. 
After these country perspectives from Russia and Brazil, the volume 
concludes with three papers that focus on specific substantive legal and 
governance challenges. In his contribution on transnational and interna-
tional crime, Reichel addresses some trends and challenges in the global 
legal environment concerning these crimes. Whereas international crime 
refers to “acts that threaten the world order and security”, the concept of 
transnational crime is used “for crimes that affect the interests of more than 
one state and are committed for personal gain and profit”. The most com-
mon transnational crimes are the provision of illicit goods or service and 
the infiltration of business or government. Reichel’s assessment of the cur-
rent institutions to deal with these crimes is mixed. The International Crim-
inal Court (‘ICC’) suggests that “there is considerable room for improve-
ment”. Instead of a global move away from the ICC, according to Reichel, 
it is more likely that the ICC will undergo some reforms – “especially in 
terms of having clearer and more realistic goals”. With regard to transna-
tional crime, Reichel sketches a more positive picture. He demonstrates that 
a variety of international instruments including bilateral and multilateral 
agreements have been set up to effectively deal with transnational crime: 
Problems do remain, however, and they are not insignificant. 
Issues or sovereignty are often raised, the ability (financial, 
technical, political and so on) of some countries to abide by 
agreements is difficult, human rights and privacy issues can 
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be challenging to reconcile, and competition among agen-
cies/organisations presents barriers. 
Reichel illustrates these challenges and problems with the example of hu-
man trafficking. What about the future of strategies to combat transnational 
crime? Reichel observes three developments. First, emerging crimes such 
as wildlife and forest crime as well as cybercrime will draw attention. Sec-
ond, the gender bias will be corrected. More attention will be paid to 
women both as offenders and victims. Third, civil society and business will 
be included to a greater degree in strategies to combat transnational crimes: 
The role of governments and supra-national organisations is 
not expected to diminish, but we are likely to see an increased 
role for non-governmental organisations (‘NGOs’), non-profit 
groups, and private companies (for example, ships increas-
ingly use private security forces as they travel through areas 
at high risk for sea piracy). 
Brammertz and Hughes paint an optimistic picture of international 
crime based on their experiences: 
Over these last two decades, international criminal justice has 
shown that it can achieve important results in practice. Hun-
dreds of individuals have been tried and convicted for war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, including 80 
by the ICTY to-date and 62 by the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda. Those brought to trial include senior polit-
ical leaders like Charles Taylor (President of Liberia), Jean 
Kambanda (Prime Minister of Rwanda), Hissène Habré (Pres-
ident of Chad), Nikola Šainović (Deputy Prime Minister of 
Yugoslavia), Radovan Karadžić (President of the Republika 
Srpska) and Nuon Chea (Prime Minister of Cambodia). 
Yet, at the same time, Brammertz and Hughes observe an increasing re-
sistance to accountability. They also acknowledge that repeated attempts to 
establish justice processes for the most serious current conflicts have failed. 
As well as in the past international justice has to face the “critical challenge 
of obtaining state co-operation”. 
The increased role of national courts should be regarded as an oppor-
tunity to improve global justice. The future may also benefit from some 
lessons drawn by these experienced practitioners. Brammertz and Hughes 
suggest three key lessons. First, “the willingness of affected states to co-
operate with justice mechanisms must be seen as decisive to the success of 
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accountability processes and a key factor to influence. In other words, in-
ternational justice requires diplomatic influence and persuasion to suc-
ceed”. Second, “strategic pragmatism is often a necessary tool in pursuing 
accountability. Comprehensive justice must remain the ultimate goal. But 
because what is achievable will vary over time, an incremental approach 
may often be required”. Finally, “affected states are more likely to agree to 
co-operate with justice mechanisms when the full spectrum of diplomatic 
tools is engaged and justice is linked to other desirable outcomes”. Taken 
together, it is uncertain whether the experience with international criminal 
law of the past decades marks the end of its beginning or the beginning of 
its end. As can be expected from practitioners, they conclude that the risk 
of ineffective justice is critical but manageable. If the room for improve-
ment signalled by Reichel is effectively dealt with, we may well have wit-
nessed the end of the beginning of international criminal law. 
This volume concludes with a contribution that may provide a 
glimpse as to the future of the global legal environment. As climate change 
has rapidly become a global problem that affects all parts of the world, al-
beit in different ways, the sense of urgency that global solutions are neces-
sary has grown. In his contribution, Lefeber shows that global legal and 
governance solutions are possible even despite the trends indicated in the 
previous papers in this volume. Even though the New Global Climate Con-
stitution has yet to prove itself, and the new US presidency has to commit 
itself to its development, this global regime demonstrates some lessons and 
conditions for global legal and governance regimes. As Lefeber argues, a 
global problem must be felt in all parts of the world and the problem defi-
nition must be supported by experts and science. Lefeber demonstrates that 
the “deadlock could only be overcome after science demonstrated that the 
dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system could only 
be avoided if all countries would contribute to mitigation”. Second, the pro-
cess in which the global regime is developed has to be “inclusive in terms 
of participation in the efforts to mitigate climate change and, therefore, po-
tentially more effective in achieving the objective”. Third, the process 
should not only include states and public authorities but also business and 
NGOs. Lefeber concludes that the “New Global Climate Constitution may 
have created the momentum for the emerging public-private partnerships 
and private-sector initiatives that contribute to mitigation, adaptation and 
acceptance of climate change, including the mobilization of financial 
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resources”. Finally, the global regime has to be backed by national legal 
institutions: 
Since the beginning of this century, there has been a prolifer-
ation of climate change related cases in courts around the 
world. Many of these cases have been initiated by civil soci-
ety. 
The combination of scientific evidence of the global problem, the inclu-
siveness of the regime, and the support system of business, NGOs and na-
tional courts may provide some clues for a future global legal and govern-
ance environment that works even in an uncertain and volatile world. 
1.3. Conclusions and Implications for European Legal Strategies  
The ambiguity and uncertainty in the global legal and governance environ-
ment may be unprecedented, at least in recent history, but these character-
istics are here to stay. It has become dangerous to rely on a stable legal and 
governance strategy in the volatile global legal and governance environ-
ment. Strategies that do not build in uncertainty will become obsolete in no 
time, with any single strategy certain to fail. Legal and governance strate-
gies have to be plural to survive the ambiguous context in which they are 
implemented. As demonstrated, the legal strategies of the EU and the Eu-
ropean Commission do not sufficiently address the demands of the current 
global legal environment. The ‘thick’ conception of the rule of law included 
in both the European treaties and the policies of the European Commission, 
as well as the self-evident nature of multilateral public legal and govern-
ance regimes, shows that these strategies are built on the assumption that 
the ‘Global Constitution’ scenario will evolve. It is thus possible that the 
European legal and governance strategies lack the flexibility and plurality 
necessary to survive a volatile and ambiguous global legal and governance 
environment. 
With the chapters in this volume, we have aimed at making sense of 
the current global legal and governance environment. Even though the top-
ics and the assessment of the current situation differ substantially, there are 
some general observations and common threads. A first commonality in the 
chapters is the acknowledgement that neither internationalisation nor pub-
lic authority, the cornerstones of the ‘Global Constitution’ scenario, can be 
relied upon. In our scenarios we presented internationalisation and privati-
sation of global legal and governance regimes as key uncertainties. Both 
trends could further mature but also reverse. It appears that most of the 
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authors in this volume observe a tendency to re-discover and re-install na-
tional borders while privatisation of law and governance is stronger than 
ever before. A second commonality in the chapters is the acknowledgement 
that the only global legal and governance mechanisms that work are those 
that are perceived as both inclusive and just. The regimes that work should 
encourage participation and equity of interests. Third, the global legal and 
governance regimes that work have to connect public and private transna-
tional regulatory schemes. Transnational and global governance will only 
be effective and legitimate if it is built on public-private partnerships that 
combine the strengths of public authorities (particularly enforcement) and 
business, NGOs and local communities (particularly legitimacy and em-
beddedness).  
These lessons and observations suggest that only a new generation of 
European legal and governance strategies will survive the future global le-
gal and governance environment. Such strategies should first build on a 
combination of selective internationalisation of law and governance. While 
the existing strategies build on the assumption that the global legal and gov-
ernance environment will evolve according to the ‘Global Constitution’ 
scenario, a new generation of European legal strategies has to include both 
the ‘Legal Borders’ and ‘Legal Internet’ scenarios. Internationalisation of 
law and governance is only appropriate if the problem is transnational and 
all partners on all levels – both public and private – are strongly committed.  
Second, commitment on the national level requires participation and 
equity instead of a naïve belief that the European or Western models are 
superior to the interests of other parts of the world. Only legal and govern-
ance institutions that are globally perceived as inclusive and just will be 
legitimate and effective. For example, transnational institutions that are not 
perceived as such cannot rely on compliance and backing by national 
courts.  
Finally, European legal and governance strategies should build on 
public-private partnerships. Transnational private regimes have become 
mature and urgently need connectivity with public regimes. Business, 
NGOs, communities, and other private parties have demonstrated the abil-
ity to set standards and develop dispute resolution regimes that work. In 
order to sustain such transnational private regimes, and to utilise their 
strengths, they should be included in the European legal and governance 
strategies.  
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A European legal and governance strategy built upon these principles 
will prove to be robust and increase the probability of surviving different 
global legal and governance environments. Instead of assuming that the 
world will evolve to a ‘Global Constitution’ scenario, such a strategy also 
takes into account the possibilities that the global legal and governance en-
vironment evolves according to the ‘Legal Borders’ and ‘Legal Internet’ 
scenarios. As Joerges demonstrates in this volume by using Rodrik’s glob-
alisation trilemma, the suggested legal and governance strategy mixes a 
choice of both strengthening democracy and national autonomy. Assuming 
that this trilemma is inevitable, a choice of a new generation of European 
legal and governance strategies also means a choice of less globalisation. 
Whether the disadvantages of less globalisation outweigh the advantages 
of a better aligned European legal and governance strategy is a political 
matter that we gladly leave to those elected to make this choice. 
